David Passenier, Colin Mols, Jan Bím, & Alexei Sharpanskykh. (2013). Understanding crises: Investigating organizational safety culture by combining organizational ethnography and agent modeling. In J. Geldermann and T. Müller S. Fortier F. F. T. Comes (Ed.), ISCRAM 2013 Conference Proceedings – 10th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 566–570). KIT; Baden-Baden: Karlsruher Institut fur Technologie.
Abstract: This paper presents a novel, advanced research approach to investigate organizational safety culture as a complex phenomenon, combining agent modeling and organizational ethnography. Safety culture is an emergent property of organizations that largely influences the resilience of organizational responses in crisis situations. However, theory describing the precise ways in which safety culture influences resilience is lacking. Thus the first step is to understand how safety culture gradually emerges from interactions between formal and informal organizational processes. The paper explains the proposed research methodology illustrated by a case of an aircraft maintenance organization. A preliminary analysis is performed from which a conceptual model is derived, and the subsequent simulation and automated analytical techniques that will be used to validate the model and gain new insights are explained.
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David Passenier, Jeroen Wolbers, Julia Mollee, Kees Boersma, & Peter Groenewegen. (2012). Formalization of crisis response coordination from a public inquiry report. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University.
Abstract: We assess the usability of public inquiry report data to build a formal trace that can be used in later stages to create an agent model simulating crisis response coordination. The case taken is a train tunnel fire near the underground train station at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol that turned out to be harmless, but the incident illustrated key weaknesses in inter-organizational coordination causing a slower response than required in case of a more serious fire. We present a taxonomy of data problems resulting from our attempt to reconstruct a logical series of events. This highlights gaps or ambiguities in data pertaining to coordination practices, communication networks, situational properties and information and communication systems. Our formal trace cannot support all the report's claims that explain the failures in coordination. The report data show some critical problems, but can still serve as a basis for an information network model of the crisis. © 2012 ISCRAM.
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