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Ariën J. Van Der Wal, & Tim J. Grant. (2013). Simulating information sharing in crisis response coalitions as a minority game. In J. Geldermann and T. Müller S. Fortier F. F. T. Comes (Ed.), ISCRAM 2013 Conference Proceedings – 10th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 120–124). KIT; Baden-Baden: Karlsruher Institut fur Technologie.
Abstract: A major crisis or disaster attracts a response from multiple organizations. These organizations need to work together as a coalition. To do so effectively, they must share information. Differences in organizational culture give information a scarcity value, leading to the emergence of information markets. As the crisis progresses, organizations learn to work together, building up trust and lowering the “price” for information shared. Organizations that have worked together in previous crises have a price advantage. In short, the information sharing changes dynamically. Evolutionary game theory – And the minority game in particular – has been recently applied to markets in which physical goods are exchanged. This paper presents the first results from simulating an information sharing market in crisis response coalitions as a minority game.
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Peter A. Jongejan, & Tim J. Grant. (2012). Social media in command & control: An extended framework. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University.
Abstract: Our research is aimed at investigating whether social media has a role to play in military Command & Control. Since social media is peer-to-peer, it could facilitate Network-Enabled Capabilities. A useful theoretical development is Reuter, Marx, and Pipek's (2011) proposal of a two-by-two matrix for social software infrastructure. Their framework assumes one-way communication and monolithic organizations. However, to operate in a real-time, dynamic environment, crisis management organizations must close the decision-making loop. Moreover, they must be structured into an action part that handles the crisis on-site, and a control part that monitors and directs operations in real time. The purpose of this work-in-progress paper is to present our extension of Reuter et al's framework. The paper outlines Reuter et al's framework, summarises the basic theory of Command & Control, describes how we extended Reuter et al's framework, and outlines further research. © 2012 ISCRAM.
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Tim J. Grant. (2011). Combining information sharing and seeking in networked coalitions. In E. Portela L. S. M.A. Santos (Ed.), 8th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management: From Early-Warning Systems to Preparedness and Training, ISCRAM 2011. Lisbon: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: Coalitions are the rule in crisis management and military operations. Although the partners do not form part of an organizational hierarchy, they need to share information to find their place in the coalition, to prepare plans collaboratively, to synchronize their actions, to evaluate their achievements, and to negotiate changes in their relationships. Interviews of experienced military officers have shown that information sharing in coalitions is more complex than one-way information transmission. It has the characteristics of an information market in which security regulations give information a scarcity value, with both sources and recipients initiating action. The emerging literature on information markets includes few process models. The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical, four-stage process model for information sharing between coalition partners in the context of Network Enabled Capabilities. The model combines information sharing and seeking, integrates intelligence collection, and supports a range of market mechanisms.
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Tim J. Grant. (2009). Towards mixed rational-naturalistic decision support for command & control. In S. J. J. Landgren (Ed.), ISCRAM 2009 – 6th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management: Boundary Spanning Initiatives and New Perspectives. Gothenburg: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: Information systems for crisis response and management, including military Command & Control systems, are designed to support their users' decision-making processes. Decision making can be rational or naturalistic. Psychologists have shown that experienced decision makers under time pressure prefer using naturalistic methods. Case studies of four implemented Command & Control systems show that most decision support assumes rational decision making. Some support for naturalistic decision making is becoming available. We identify a mix of rational and naturalistic decision support tools as being desirable for flexible Command & Control.
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Tim J. Grant. (2008). Checklist for comparing emergency management information systems. In B. V. de W. F. Fiedrich (Ed.), Proceedings of ISCRAM 2008 – 5th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 752–763). Washington, DC: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: This paper describes a checklist that has been developed for comparing the functionality of emergency management control centres and their information systems. The intention is to interest the ISCRAM community in using the checklist in various applications and pooling experiences. The Control Centre Visit Checklist has evolved through four iterations. It has been used to study two military C2 systems and one non-military control system, and has been applied by students for course assignments. The paper focuses on the part of the checklist that evaluates the information system from the systems viewpoint. It describes the underlying applications architecture and process model. The Royal Netherlands Army's Battlefield Management System illustrates the application of the checklist. The results show that the checklist aids in identifying where C2 systems can be developed further. The next step is to perform a set of substantial pilot studies for diverse domains, including civilian emergency management systems.
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Tim J. Grant. (2005). Integrating sensemaking and response using planning operator induction. In B. C. B. Van de Walle (Ed.), Proceedings of ISCRAM 2005 – 2nd International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 89–96). Brussels: Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium.
Abstract: Emergency response managers often try to prepare plans in advance of foreseeable crises. However, pre-prepared plans almost never fit the precise situation when an actual crisis arises. This paper focuses on what can be done once the plan has been found to be a mismatch with the actual situation, and particularly on sensemaking and its integration into generating a response to a crisis situation. This paper proposes planning operator induction as a suitable technique. The Air Traffic Control and military air defence situation over the continental US on September 11, 2001, serves as the illustrative application. Since the paper reports research in progress, it closes by outlining the additional functionality that will have to be added to the existing POI implementation to produce a sensemaking tool.
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Tim J. Grant, & Ariën J. Van Der Wal. (2012). A taxonomy of market mechanisms for information sharing in crisis response coalitions. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University.
Abstract: Information sharing is crucial in responding to and managing crises. A great variety of organizations respond to crises, ranging from international organizations, through non-governmental organizations, commercial suppliers, government ministries, and the media, to individual volunteers. At best, they collaborate to combine their respective strengths in creating synergy. At worst, they deconflict their operations so that the one does not get in the way of the other. In either case, the organizations must communicate with one another. Previous research has shown that this communication takes the form of an information market. This paper considers the possible mechanisms for information markets in humanitarian and military coalitions. While there has been work on market mechanisms in the economics literature, this needs to be adapted for the exchange of information and information services instead of physical goods and services. This paper proposes a taxonomy of market mechanisms that is tailored to information sharing within coalitions. © 2012 ISCRAM.
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Tim J. Grant, F.L.E. Geugies, & Peter A. Jongejan. (2013). Social media in command & control: A proof-of principle experiment. In J. Geldermann and T. Müller S. Fortier F. F. T. Comes (Ed.), ISCRAM 2013 Conference Proceedings – 10th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 52–61). KIT; Baden-Baden: Karlsruher Institut fur Technologie.
Abstract: The literature on the organizational use of social media in crisis response and management is largely concerned with communication between organizations and the general public (“citizens”). By contrast, there are few papers on the use of social media within organizations for operational purposes. One essential operational capability in such organizations is Command & Control (C2) or its equivalent. Our research focuses on the use of social media in C2 for crisis management at the operational and tactical levels. To enable the use of social media in C2, Jongejan and Grant (2012) extended Reuter, Marx and Pipek's (2011) theoretical framework. In the research reported in this paper, the extended framework was tested by performing a proof-of-principle experiment for a famine relief scenario with human subjects in the laboratory. The results show that more extensive concept demonstrations and field experimentation are justified.
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Tim J. Grant, & Gijs Van Den Heuvel. (2010). Modelling the information sharing process in military coalitions: A work in progress. In C. Zobel B. T. S. French (Ed.), ISCRAM 2010 – 7th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management: Defining Crisis Management 3.0, Proceedings. Seattle, WA: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: Coalition partners must share information to work together. Models of information sharing assume that it is a linear, one-way process. As part of a larger project, we studied information sharing in military coalitions. Interviews of 47 officers in NATO R&D organizations showed that one piece of information was often traded for another. This is characteristic of an information market. Security regulations make information a scarce resource, although trust may allow the regulations to be waived. Our observations have consequences for the military Network Enabled Capabilities community in their desire to migrate to a “need to share” security principle. Failing to find a suitable process model in the literature, we outline requirements and identify two possible starting points for modelling the information sharing process in military coalitions.
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