Tim J. Grant. (2011). Combining information sharing and seeking in networked coalitions. In E. Portela L. S. M.A. Santos (Ed.), 8th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management: From Early-Warning Systems to Preparedness and Training, ISCRAM 2011. Lisbon: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: Coalitions are the rule in crisis management and military operations. Although the partners do not form part of an organizational hierarchy, they need to share information to find their place in the coalition, to prepare plans collaboratively, to synchronize their actions, to evaluate their achievements, and to negotiate changes in their relationships. Interviews of experienced military officers have shown that information sharing in coalitions is more complex than one-way information transmission. It has the characteristics of an information market in which security regulations give information a scarcity value, with both sources and recipients initiating action. The emerging literature on information markets includes few process models. The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical, four-stage process model for information sharing between coalition partners in the context of Network Enabled Capabilities. The model combines information sharing and seeking, integrates intelligence collection, and supports a range of market mechanisms.
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Tim J. Grant, & Ariën J. Van Der Wal. (2012). A taxonomy of market mechanisms for information sharing in crisis response coalitions. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University.
Abstract: Information sharing is crucial in responding to and managing crises. A great variety of organizations respond to crises, ranging from international organizations, through non-governmental organizations, commercial suppliers, government ministries, and the media, to individual volunteers. At best, they collaborate to combine their respective strengths in creating synergy. At worst, they deconflict their operations so that the one does not get in the way of the other. In either case, the organizations must communicate with one another. Previous research has shown that this communication takes the form of an information market. This paper considers the possible mechanisms for information markets in humanitarian and military coalitions. While there has been work on market mechanisms in the economics literature, this needs to be adapted for the exchange of information and information services instead of physical goods and services. This paper proposes a taxonomy of market mechanisms that is tailored to information sharing within coalitions. © 2012 ISCRAM.
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Ariën J. Van Der Wal, & Tim J. Grant. (2013). Simulating information sharing in crisis response coalitions as a minority game. In J. Geldermann and T. Müller S. Fortier F. F. T. Comes (Ed.), ISCRAM 2013 Conference Proceedings – 10th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 120–124). KIT; Baden-Baden: Karlsruher Institut fur Technologie.
Abstract: A major crisis or disaster attracts a response from multiple organizations. These organizations need to work together as a coalition. To do so effectively, they must share information. Differences in organizational culture give information a scarcity value, leading to the emergence of information markets. As the crisis progresses, organizations learn to work together, building up trust and lowering the “price” for information shared. Organizations that have worked together in previous crises have a price advantage. In short, the information sharing changes dynamically. Evolutionary game theory – And the minority game in particular – has been recently applied to markets in which physical goods are exchanged. This paper presents the first results from simulating an information sharing market in crisis response coalitions as a minority game.
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