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Author Stefan Schauer; Stefan Rass; Sandra König; Klaus Steinnocher; Thomas Schaberreiter; Gerald Quirchmayr pdf  isbn
openurl 
  Title Cross-Domain Risk Analysis to Strengthen City Resilience: the ODYSSEUS Approach Type Conference Article
  Year 2020 Publication ISCRAM 2020 Conference Proceedings – 17th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management Abbreviated Journal Iscram 2020  
  Volume Issue Pages 652-662  
  Keywords Risk Management; Cross-Domain Networks; Interdependencies; Stochastic Model; City Resilience; Critical Infrastructures  
  Abstract In this article, we want to present the concept for a risk management approach to assess the condition of critical infrastructure networks within metropolitan areas, their interdependencies among each other and the potential cascading effects. In contrast to existing solutions, this concept aims at providing a holistic view on the variety of interconnected networks within a city and the complex dependencies among them. Therefore, stochastic models and simulations are integrated into risk management to improve the assessment of cascading effects and support decision makers in crisis situations. This holistic view will allow risk managers at the city administration as well as emergency organizations to understand the full consequences of an incident and plan mitigation actions accordingly. Additionally, the approach will help to further strengthen the resilience of the entire city as well as the individual critical infrastructures in crisis situations.  
  Address AIT Austrian Institute of Technology; Alpen-Adria Universit\"at Klagenfurt; AIT Austrian Institute of Technology;AIT Austrian Institute of Technology;University of Vienna; University of Vienna  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Virginia Tech Place of Publication Blacksburg, VA (USA) Editor (up) Amanda Hughes; Fiona McNeill; Christopher W. Zobel  
  Language English Summary Language English Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 978-1-949373-27-60 ISBN 2411-3446 Medium  
  Track Resilience in Critical Infrastructures Expedition Conference 17th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management  
  Notes stefan.schauer@ait.ac.at Approved no  
  Call Number Serial 2261  
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Author Stefan Schauer; Stefan Rass; Sandra König pdf  openurl
  Title Simulation-driven Risk Model for Interdependent Critical Infrastructures Type Conference Article
  Year 2021 Publication ISCRAM 2021 Conference Proceedings – 18th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management Abbreviated Journal Iscram 2021  
  Volume Issue Pages 404-415  
  Keywords risk model, risk assessment, interdependent critical infrastructures, cross-domain simulation  
  Abstract Critical infrastructures (CIs) in urban areas or municipalities have evolved into strongly interdependent and highly complex networks. To assess risks in this sophisticated environment, classical risk management approaches require extensions to reflect those interdependencies and include the consequences of cascading effects into the assessment. In this paper, we present a concept for a risk model specifically tailored to those requirements of interdependent CIs. We will show how the interdependencies can be reflected in the risk model in a generic way such that the dependencies among CIs on different levels of abstraction can be described. Furthermore, we will highlight how the simulation of cascading effects can be directly integrated to consistently represent the assessment of those effects in the risk model. In this way, the model supports municipalities' decision makers in improving their risk and resilience management of the CIs under their administration.  
  Address AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH; System Security Group, Department of Applied Informatics, Universitaet Klagenfurt; Austrian Institute of Technology  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Virginia Tech Place of Publication Blacksburg, VA (USA) Editor (up) Anouck Adrot; Rob Grace; Kathleen Moore; Christopher W. Zobel  
  Language English Summary Language English Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 978-1-949373-61-5 ISBN Medium  
  Track Enhancing Protection of Critical Infrastructures Expedition Conference 18th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management  
  Notes stefan.schauer@ait.ac.at Approved no  
  Call Number ISCRAM @ idladmin @ Serial 2342  
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Author Sandra König; Stefan Schauer pdf  isbn
openurl 
  Title Cascading Threats in Critical Infrastructures with Control Systems Type Conference Article
  Year 2019 Publication Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response And Management Abbreviated Journal Iscram 2019  
  Volume Issue Pages  
  Keywords Cascading failures, industrial control systems, critical infrastructures, hybrid situational awareness  
  Abstract Critical infrastructures (CIs) increase in complexity due to numerous dependencies on other CIs but also due to the ongoing digitalization in the industry sector. This yields an increased risk of failure of a single CI as the overall systems gets very fragile and sensitive to errors Failure of a single component may affect large parts of an infrastructure due to cascading effects. One way to support functionality of a CI is the use of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) that allow monitoring remote sites and controlling processes. However, this is an additional source for threats as recent cyber-attacks have shown. Further, the additional information for such cyber systems is often not efficiently combined with existing information on the physical infrastructure. We here propose a method to combine these two sources of information in order to estimate the impact of a security incident on CIs, taking into account cascading effects of threats. An implementation of the model allows simulation of the dynamics inside a CI and yields a record of the status of each asset of the CI. The way the assets change their states illustrates the consequences of an incident on the entire CI. Visualization of the results provides an overview on the situation of the entire CI at a certain point of time and a sequence of such visualization over an entire period of time illustrates the changes over time. The results from this analysis may be used to support security officers in analyzing the current (hybrid) state of their CI in case of an incident and thus increase the hybrid situational awareness.  
  Address Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Iscram Place of Publication Valencia, Spain Editor (up) Franco, Z.; González, J.J.; Canós, J.H.  
  Language English Summary Language English Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 2411-3387 ISBN 978-84-09-10498-7 Medium  
  Track T14 - Protecting Critical Infrastructures in Crisis Situations Expedition Conference 16th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM 2019)  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Serial 1932  
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Author Sandra König pdf  isbn
openurl 
  Title Choosing Ways to Increase Resilience in Critical Infrastructures Type Conference Article
  Year 2019 Publication Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response And Management Abbreviated Journal Iscram 2019  
  Volume Issue Pages  
  Keywords Resilience, critical infrastructure, optimization  
  Abstract Increasing resilience is a core interest in critical infrastructure (CI) protection that involves many challenges. It is necessary to agree on a common understanding of resilience and identify potential strategies to improve it.

Once this is done, the question arises how to choose among these strategies. We propose to decide based on a game-theoretic framework that allows identification of optimal actions under various scenarios. This framework considers different threat scenarios as attacks to the CI and the identified strategies to improve resilience as defense strategies for the CI. Since the payoff of the game, namely the resilience of the CI, can hardly be measured with certainty we choose an extension of classical game theory that allows taking uncertainty into account and still finds provably optimal solutions. This approach is especially useful in a situation where we aim to optimize a quantity that is difficult to measure (such as resilience). The result of this analysis is two-fold: it identifies an optimal defense but also provides information about the resilience in the worst case. The approach is illustrated with a small example using a publicly available implementation.
 
  Address Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Iscram Place of Publication Valencia, Spain Editor (up) Franco, Z.; González, J.J.; Canós, J.H.  
  Language English Summary Language English Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 2411-3387 ISBN 978-84-09-10498-7 Medium  
  Track T14 - Protecting Critical Infrastructures in Crisis Situations Expedition Conference 16th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM 2019)  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Serial 1914  
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Author Stefan Schauer; Stefan Rass; Sandra König; Thomas Grafenauer; Martin Latzenhofer pdf  isbn
openurl 
  Title Analyzing Cascading Effects among Critical Infrastructures Type Conference Article
  Year 2018 Publication ISCRAM 2018 Conference Proceedings – 15th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management Abbreviated Journal Iscram 2018  
  Volume Issue Pages 428-437  
  Keywords Cascading effects, interdependent critical infrastructures, Markov chains, simulation  
  Abstract In this article, we present a novel approach, which allows not only to identify potential cascading effects within a network of interrelated critical infrastructures but also supports the assessment of these cascading effects. Based on percolation theory and Markov chains, our method models the interdependencies among various infrastructures and evaluates the possible consequences if an infrastructure has to reduce its capacity or is failing completely, by simulating the effects over time. Additionally, our approach is designed to take the intrinsic uncertainty into account, which resides in the description of potential consequences a failing critical infrastructure might cause, by using probabilistic state transitions. In this way, not only the critical infrastructure's risk and security managers are able to evaluate the consequences of an incident anywhere in the network but also the emergency services can use this information to improve their operation in case of a crisis and anticipate potential trouble spots.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Rochester Institute of Technology Place of Publication Rochester, NY (USA) Editor (up) Kees Boersma; Brian Tomaszeski  
  Language English Summary Language English Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 2411-3387 ISBN 978-0-692-12760-5 Medium  
  Track Planning, Foresight and Risk Analysis Expedition Conference ISCRAM 2018 Conference Proceedings - 15th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Serial 2120  
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