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Modeling of attacking and defending strategies in situations with intentional threats
Xiaofeng Hu
Shifei Shen
Jiansong Wu
L. Rothkrantz, J.R., Z.Franco
Intentional threats including terrorism have become a worldwide catastrophe risk since recent years. To protect the cities from being attacked, the macro-level study of decision analysis should be given more considerations. In this paper, we proposed a model for describing the strategic game between attackers and defenders based on the methodology of matrix game. This model can be employed to determine which target will be selected by attackers and which attacking strategy and defending strategy will be chosen by attackers and defenders respectively. Furthermore, the defenders of the city can use this model to set priorities among their defending strategies. The importance of this work is to establish a reasonable framework for modeling the attacking and defending strategies rather than assessing the real risk of urban targets, so the model is illustrated by using fictitious numbers. The model proposed in this paper can provide scientific basis for macroscopic decision making in responding to intentional threats. © 2012 ISCRAM.
urn:ISBN:9780864913326
openurl:?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fidl.iscram.org%2F&genre=proceeding&title=Modeling%20of%20attacking%20and%20defending%20strategies%20in%20situations%20with%20intentional%20threats&stitle=ISCRAM%202012&issn=2411-3387&isbn=9780864913326&date=2012&aulast=Xiaofeng%20Hu&au=Shifei%20Shen&au=Jiansong%20Wu&pub=Simon%20Fraser%20University&place=Vancouver%2C%20BC&sid=refbase%3AISCRAM
url:http://idl.iscram.org/show.php?record=133
citekey:XiaofengHu_etal2012
citation:Xiaofeng Hu, Shifei Shen, & Jiansong Wu. (2012). Modeling of attacking and defending strategies in situations with intentional threats. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University.
2012
ConferencePaper
text
Decision theory
Game theory
Information systems
Risk assessment
Targets
Attacking strategy
Intentional threats
Matrix game
Scientific basis
Strategic game
Strategy
Decision making
file:http://idl.iscram.org/files/hu/2012/133_Hu_etal2012.pdf
Simon Fraser University
English
2411-3387
ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management
2012
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