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Abstract: Intentional threats including terrorism have become a worldwide catastrophe risk since recent years. To protect the cities from being attacked, the macro-level study of decision analysis should be given more considerations. In this paper, we proposed a model for describing the strategic game between attackers and defenders based on the methodology of matrix game. This model can be employed to determine which target will be selected by attackers and which attacking strategy and defending strategy will be chosen by attackers and defenders respectively. Furthermore, the defenders of the city can use this model to set priorities among their defending strategies. The importance of this work is to establish a reasonable framework for modeling the attacking and defending strategies rather than assessing the real risk of urban targets, so the model is illustrated by using fictitious numbers. The model proposed in this paper can provide scientific basis for macroscopic decision making in responding to intentional threats. Â© 2012 ISCRAM.

Keywords: Decision theory; Game theory; Information systems; Risk assessment; Targets; Attacking strategy; Intentional threats; Matrix game; Scientific basis; Strategic game; Strategy; Decision making

Track: Analytical Modeling and Simulation

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Abstract: A major crisis or disaster attracts a response from multiple organizations. These organizations need to work together as a coalition. To do so effectively, they must share information. Differences in organizational culture give information a scarcity value, leading to the emergence of information markets. As the crisis progresses, organizations learn to work together, building up trust and lowering the “price” for information shared. Organizations that have worked together in previous crises have a price advantage. In short, the information sharing changes dynamically. Evolutionary game theory – And the minority game in particular – has been recently applied to markets in which physical goods are exchanged. This paper presents the first results from simulating an information sharing market in crisis response coalitions as a minority game.

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	Xiaofeng Hu, Shifei Shen, & Jiansong Wu. (2012). Modeling of attacking and defending strategies in situations with intentional threats. In Z.Franco J. R. L. Rothkrantz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2012 Conference Proceedings – 9th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University. Abstract: Intentional threats including terrorism have become a worldwide catastrophe risk since recent years. To protect the cities from being attacked, the macro-level study of decision analysis should be given more considerations. In this paper, we proposed a model for describing the strategic game between attackers and defenders based on the methodology of matrix game. This model can be employed to determine which target will be selected by attackers and which attacking strategy and defending strategy will be chosen by attackers and defenders respectively. Furthermore, the defenders of the city can use this model to set priorities among their defending strategies. The importance of this work is to establish a reasonable framework for modeling the attacking and defending strategies rather than assessing the real risk of urban targets, so the model is illustrated by using fictitious numbers. The model proposed in this paper can provide scientific basis for macroscopic decision making in responding to intentional threats. Â© 2012 ISCRAM. Keywords: Decision theory; Game theory; Information systems; Risk assessment; Targets; Attacking strategy; Intentional threats; Matrix game; Scientific basis; Strategic game; Strategy; Decision making Track: Analytical Modeling and Simulation Share to FB \| Save citation: RTF PDF LaTeX \| Export record: Atom XML MODS XML OAI_DC XML ODF XML SRW_DC XML SRW_MODS XML
	Ariën J. Van Der Wal, & Tim J. Grant. (2013). Simulating information sharing in crisis response coalitions as a minority game. In J. Geldermann and T. Müller S. Fortier F. F. T. Comes (Ed.), ISCRAM 2013 Conference Proceedings – 10th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 120–124). KIT; Baden-Baden: Karlsruher Institut fur Technologie. Abstract: A major crisis or disaster attracts a response from multiple organizations. These organizations need to work together as a coalition. To do so effectively, they must share information. Differences in organizational culture give information a scarcity value, leading to the emergence of information markets. As the crisis progresses, organizations learn to work together, building up trust and lowering the “price” for information shared. Organizations that have worked together in previous crises have a price advantage. In short, the information sharing changes dynamically. Evolutionary game theory – And the minority game in particular – has been recently applied to markets in which physical goods are exchanged. This paper presents the first results from simulating an information sharing market in crisis response coalitions as a minority game. Keywords: Commerce; Game theory; Information analysis; Information systems; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary games; Information market; Information sharing; Minority game; Multiple organizations; Organizational cultures; Trust; Societies and institutions Track: Coordination and Collaboration Share to FB \| Save citation: RTF PDF LaTeX \| Export record: Atom XML MODS XML OAI_DC XML ODF XML SRW_DC XML SRW_MODS XML