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Douglas A. Samuelson, Matthew Parker, Austin Zimmerman, Loren Miller, Stephen Guerin, Joshua Thorp, et al. (2008). Agent-based simulations of mass egress after Improvised Explosive Device attacks. In B. V. de W. F. Fiedrich (Ed.), Proceedings of ISCRAM 2008 – 5th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 59–70). Washington, DC: Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM.
Abstract: For the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the U. S. Department of Homeland Security, we developed agent-based computer simulation models of mass egress from a stadium and a subway station following one or more attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs.) Anti-IED countermeasures we modeled included improved guidance to exits, baffles to absorb shock and shrapnel, and, for the stadium, egress onto the playing field. We found improved real-time information systems that provide better guidance to exits would substantially expedite egress and could reduce secondary (trampling and crush) casualties. Our results indicate that models like these can be useful aids to selecting countermeasures, and for training, preparation and exercises. We also discuss the unusual problems such models pose for real-time event management and for validation and evaluation.
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Jeannette N. Sutton, Emma S. Spiro, Sean M. Fitzhugh, Britta Johnson, Ben Gibson, & Carter T. Butts. (2014). Terse message amplification in the Boston bombing response. In and P.C. Shih. L. Plotnick M. S. P. S.R. Hiltz (Ed.), ISCRAM 2014 Conference Proceedings – 11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 612–621). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.
Abstract: On the morning of April 15, 2013, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, resulting in a large number of casualties. This generated a week-long response under the US National Incident Management System. In this paper, we examine online, terse messages broadcast by responding organizations and their amplification by other official entities via retransmission. Content analysis of official messages shows strong similarities with posting patterns previously observed in response to natural hazards, with the primary exception of themes related to the criminal investigation, suggesting a possible revision of guidelines for public information in light of the needs arising from extended counterterrorism operations undertaken in an urban environment. Network analysis demonstrates message posting and amplification were dominated by local actors, underscoring the importance of local readiness for management of official public information activities in the context of extremely high-profile events.
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